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Abstract A broadcasting multiple blind signature scheme based on quantumGHZ
entanglement has been presented recently. It is said that the scheme’s uncondi-
tional security is guaranteed by adopting quantum key preparation, quantum en-
cryption algorithm and quantum entanglement. In this paper, we prove that each
signatory can get the signed message just by an intercept-resend attack. Then, we
show there still exists some participant attacks and external attacks. Specifically,
we verify the message sender Alice can impersonate each signatory to sign the
message at will, and so is the signature collector Charlie. Also, we demonstrate
that the receiver Bob can forge the signature successfully, and with respect to
the external attacks, the eavesdropper Eve can modify the signature at random.
Besides, we discover Eve can change the signed message at random, and Eve can
impersonate Alice as the message sender without being discovered. In particular,
we propose an improved scheme based on the original one and show that it is secure
against not only the attacks mentioned above but also some collusion attacks.
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1 Introduction
Quantum signature is the counterpart in the quantum world of classical digital
signature. Compared with the classical one, quantum digital signature is based on
the laws of quantum physics, which makes it own many natural advantages in the
aspect of security. Therefore, quantum digital signature has foreseeable application
in E-payment system, E-business and E-government.
In 2001, Gottesman and Chuang [2] proposed a quantum digital signature
scheme based on a quantum one-way function and quantum swap test. After that,
much progress has been made. Zeng and Keitel [3] presented an arbitrated quantum
signature scheme by using GHZ entanglement in 2002. In 2009, Li et al [4] designed
a more efficient arbitrated quantum signature scheme by using Bell state. Zou
and Qiu [5] proposed an arbitrated quantum signature without entanglement in
2010. Along with the development of quantum signature, more and more quantum
signature models have been proposed for different application demands, such as
quantum proxy signature [6,7,8,9,10], quantum group signature [11,12,13,14,15],
quantum blind signature [16,17,18,19,20] and quantum multiple signature [21,22,
23].
A secure quantum signature scheme should satisfy two basic requirements:(1)
No forgery. Exactly speaking, the signature cannot be forged by any illegal signa-
tory.(2) No disavowal. The signatory cannot disavow his signature and the receiver
cannot disavow his receiving the signature and its integrity[4].
Gao et al. [24] presented a perfect cryptanalysis on existing arbitrated quantum
signature. They pointed out that the signature can be forged by the receiver in
almost all the existing arbitrated quantum signature (AQS) schemes. Zou and
Qiu gave some attacks and corresponding improvements of fair quantum blind
signature schemes [25]. After that, Lin et al. further pointed out that there still
exists a secure leakage caused by the reuse of signing key in the fair quantum
blind signature schemes [26]. In view of the existence of these serious loopholes, it
is imperative to reexamine the security of other quantum signature protocols.
Recently, a broadcasting multiple signature scheme based on quantum GHZ
entanglement has been proposed in Ref. [1]. It could be used to settle the problem
that a message is so important that needs to be signed by multiple signatories,
in order to guarantee the message’s privacy, none of signatories can acquire what
they have signed. Maybe it can be applied in E-bank system. For example: A large
number of money has to be transferred through E-bank system on the internet.
The E-bank system operator submits the request to the bank after filling the
application form including payment amount, bank transfer account and some other
information. When the request arrives, the bank clerk signs to approve. But it is
not enough, it has to ask the manager’s authority, then it needs to be signed by
the manager. In the whole process, all the signatories cannot learn what they have
signed. But the application form has been recorded in the E-bank system, when
disagreement takes place, the bank can track the message sender.
In the original work, it is said that the scheme’s unconditional security is
guaranteed by adopting quantum key preparation, quantum encryption algorithm
and quantum entanglement. Here we show that each signatory can get the message
that is to be signed just by an intercept-resend attack. Furthermore, we verify
there still exists some participant attacks and external attacks. Specifically, we
discover the message sender Alice can impersonate Ui to sign the message, and so
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is the signature collector Charlie. Additionally, we demonstrate the receiver Bob
can forge the signature successfully, and with respect to the external attacks, the
eavesdropper Eve can modify the signature at random. Besides, we find Eve can
change the message that is to be signed at will, and Eve can impersonate Alice as
the message sender without being discovered. Finally, we particularly design an
improved scheme based on the original one, and show that the new scheme can
resist the attacks that the original scheme are encountered mentioned above, and
it can also resist some collusion attacks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First, in Section 2, we briefly
review the original scheme. In Section 3, we present the attack strategies of the
original scheme in detail. Particularly, in Section 4 we design an improved scheme
based on the original one. Then in Section 5, we make a security analysis of the
improved scheme. Finally, in section 6 we make a short conclusion and give some
future issues.
2 Original scheme
2.1 Preliminary
A qubit |ψ〉 is expressed as a vector in two-dimensional Hilbert Space. Generally,
{|0〉, |1〉} is a group of typical orthonormal basis, which is called Z-basis. However,
there still exists another group of orthonormal basis called X-basis, denoted as
{|+〉, |−〉}, where
|+〉 = |0〉+ |1〉√
2
(1)
and
|−〉 = |0〉 − |1〉√
2
. (2)
From Eq. (1) and (2), it is easy to get
|0〉 = |+〉+ |−〉√
2
(3)
and
|1〉 = |+〉 − |−〉√
2
. (4)
Then, a single particle state |ψ〉 can be written in Z-basis as
|ψ〉 = a|0〉+ b|1〉 (5)
satisfying
|a|2 + |b|2 = 1. (6)
According to Eqs. (3) and (4), it can also be expressed as
|ψ〉 = a+ b√
2
|+〉+ a− b√
2
|−〉. (7)
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The original scheme is mainly based on GHZ entanglement state, which is a
three-particle maximum entanglement state expressed as
|φ〉 = |0A0B0C〉+ |1A1B1C〉√
2
. (8)
Meanwhile, it can also be expressed in X-basis as
|φ〉 = 1
2
(|+,+,+〉ABC + |+,−,−〉ABC + |−,+,−〉ABC + |−,−,+〉ABC). (9)
By Eq. (9), it is showed that the state of the particle C can be deduced by measur-
ing the particles A and B in the X-basis respectively. In other words, the state of
any particle can be deduced if the other two particles are determined. For example,
if particle A and B are in the state of |+〉, then particle C will be |+〉 definitely.
We show the correlation of GHZ state in Table 1.
A
C B
|+〉B |−〉B
|+〉A |+〉C |−〉C
|−〉A |−〉C |+〉C
Table 1 Correlation of GHZ state.
2.2 The scheme
the original scheme involves four characters: (1) Alice is the message sender. (2)
Ui (i = 1, 2, · · · , t) is i-th member of broadcasting multiple signatory. (3) Charlie
is the signature collector. (4) Bob is the receiver and verifier.
The scheme is composed of four parts: initial phase, the individual blind sig-
nature generation and verification phase, the combined multiple signature phase
and the combined multiple blind signature verification phase.
In original scheme, Alice sends t copies of an n-bit classical string m to t
signatories Ui (i = 1,2, · · · , t), respectively. Then Ui signs message m to get the
blind signature Si and sends it to Charlie. Charlie collects and verifies these blind
signatures, then he constructs a multiple signature and sends it to Bob. Finally,
Bob verifies the multiple signature by confirming the message.
1. Initial Phase
(a) Alice transforms the message m into n-bit as m = m(1)‖m(2)‖ · · · ‖m(j)‖
· · · ‖m(n). The message m is to be signed bit by bit.
(b) Quantum key distribution. Alice shares secret key KAB with Bob, secret
keys KAUi (i = 1,2, · · · , t) with each signatory Ui respectively, secret key
KAC with Charlie. Charlie shares secret keys KCUi(i = 1,2, · · · , t) with
each signatory Ui respectively. Bob shares secret key KBC with Charlie.
To obtain unconditional security, all these keys are distributed via QKD
protocols [27,28].
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(c) Alice sends KAB(m) to Bob. Here Alice encrypts m into KAB(m) by using
her own secret key KAB according to the one-time pad encryption algo-
rithm. Specifically, KAB(m) = m⊕KAB .
2. The Individual Blind Signature Generation and Verification Phase
Here we just pick one of the signatory Ui as the representative to make an
illustration.
2.1 Quantum Channel Setup
Alice generates n GHZ entanglement states which are in state of |φ〉ACUi de-
noted as {|φ(1)〉ACUi , |φ(2)〉ACUi , · · · , |φ(j)〉ACUi , · · · , |φ(n)〉ACUi}. Then Alice
distributes the particle C and Ui of each GHZ state to Charlie and the signatory
Ui respectively.
2.2 Blind Signature and Its Verification
(a) Alice measures her GHZ particle sequence in X-basis to get a classical
string a = {a(1), a(2), · · · , a(j), · · · , a(n)} according to
a(j) =
{
0 if the measurement outcome is +,
1 if the measurement outcome is −. (10)
Then Alice publishes the classical string m∗ as
m
∗ = a⊕m. (11)
Note: Here we do some modifications based on the original work as the
measurement cannot be performed according to the message m, but it still
maintains the original work.
(b) Alice encrypts a by using the secret key KAC according to the one-time
pad encryption algorithm and sends KAC(a) to Charlie.
(c) Charlie measures his GHZ particles in the X-basis and records the mea-
surement outcome sequence c = {c(1), c(2), · · · , c(j), · · · , c(n)}, where
c(j) =
{
0 if the measurement outcome is +,
1 if the measurement outcome is −. (12)
(d) In order to provide the audit voucher, Charlie has to convert the measuring
result c by quantum fingerprinting function as follows:
|f(x)〉 = 1√
m
m∑
i=1
|i〉|Ei(x)〉. (13)
Then Charlie encrypts the result |f(c)〉 with the key KCUi according to
QOTP algorithm, resulting in
|H〉 = EKCUi (|f(c)〉). (14)
Here EKCUi is the quantum encryption algorithm for qubits [29]. After that,
Charlie sends |H〉 to Ui.
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(e) On receiving |H〉, Ui measures his own GHZ particles to get the result Si
according to
Si(j) =
{
0 if the measurement outcome is +,
1 if the measurement outcome is −. (15)
Then Ui sends the encrypted result KCUi(Si) to Charlie. Here Ui encrypts
Si into KCUi(Si) according to one-time pad algorithm.
(f) Charlie decrypts KCUi(Si) into Si by using the secret key KCUi . Due to
the string c and the correlation of the GHZ state, Charlie can figure out
Alice’s measurement outcomes a′. Then Charlie can get the message m′ as
m
′ = m∗ ⊕ a′. (16)
Note that a′ and m′ will be equal to a and m respectively if there is no
mistake happened in the communication process.
(g) Charlie decrypts KAC(a) into a by using his secret key KAC , generates m
with m∗ and compares m with m′. If they are equal, Charlie accepts Si,
otherwise, it is rejected.
3. The Combined Multiple Signature Generation Phase
Charlie collects all individual signatures Si (i = 1, 2, · · · , i, · · · , t) and generates
the message m′1,m
′
2, · · · ,m′i, · · · , m′t. If m′i = m′i+1(i = 1, 2, · · · , i, · · · , t − 1),
he confirms the message and generates the multiple signature S = S1‖S2‖ · · · ‖
Si‖ · · · ‖St, otherwise, he terminates the process. After confirming the message,
Charlie sends KBC(m
′
1) to Bob. Here m
′
1 is turned into KBC(m
′
1) according
to one-time pad algorithm.
4. The Multiple signature Verification Phase
Bob decrypts KBC(m
′
1) and KAB(m), and he accepts the signature if m
′
1 = m,
otherwise, he terminates the process.
3 Attacks on Tian Yu’s scheme
In this section, we will show there are some participant attacks and external attacks
in the scheme. Here we just take a signatory Ui as a representative to illustrate
the attack strategy in detail. Sometimes, we just take one bit of the message that
is to be signed to make a demonstration.
3.1 The signatory Ui can get the message m
In order to make a clear illustration of Ui’s attack strategy, we rewrite the GHZ
entanglement state as follows:
|φ〉ACUi =
|0A0C0Ui〉+ |1A1C1Ui〉√
2
(17)
=
|0A〉|0C0Ui〉+ |1A〉|1C1Ui〉√
2
=
|+〉A√
2
(
|00〉CUi + |11〉CUi√
2
) +
|−〉A√
2
(
|00〉CUi − |11〉CUi√
2
).
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Next, we describe the signatory Ui’s intercept-resend attack strategy in detail.
Firstly, Ui intercepts the GHZ particle C when it is sent from Alice to Charlie and
combine it with his own GHZ particle Ui, then he performs a two particle measure-
ment in Bell-basis. Then Ui can deduce the state of GHZ particle A according to
the measurement outcomes. If the measurement outcome is β00, according to Eq.
(17), particle A is in the state of |+〉A definitely, then Ui can further get a(j) = 0.
If the measurement outcome is β10, particle A is in the state of |−〉A and get
a(j) = 1. Here
|β00〉CUi =
|00〉CUi + |11〉CUi√
2
, (18)
|β01〉CUi =
|01〉CUi + |10〉CUi√
2
, (19)
|β10〉CUi =
|00〉CUi − |11〉CUi√
2
(20)
and
|β11〉CUi =
|01〉CUi − |10〉CUi√
2
. (21)
According to Eq. (11), Ui can obtain m(j) with the m
∗ published by Alice in Step
2.2(a) . After that, Ui resends the GHZ particle C to Charlie. All of these cannot
be discovered in the verifying phase.
3.2 The signatory Ui can get Charlie’s measurement outcome c
In original scheme, Charlie’s measurement outcome c is encrypted by the quantum
fingerprinting function according to Eq. (13) before sending it to Ui. Consequently,
Ui cannot get c by decrypting it directly. In part 3.1, we have showed Ui can get
Alice’s measurement result by intercept-resend attack, then Ui can get c based on
the correlation of the GHZ state after he measures his GHZ particles Ui in X-basis.
Therefore, the encryption of c is failed. Furthermore, state |H〉 sent from Charlie
to Ui in Step 2.2(d) is useless, then it can be removed.
3.3 The message sender Alice can impersonate Ui to sign message at will
Here we show Alice can impersonate Ui to sign message in the original scheme.
In the signature phase, Alice sets up the quantum channel by generating n GHZ
entanglement states and then sending particle C and Ui to Charlie and signatory Ui
separately. In this step, Alice can send particle Ui to the signatory but postpone to
send particle C to Charlie. Meanwhile, she measures the two particles in her hand
in Bell-basis and records the measurement outcomes. According to Eq. (17), she
can deduce the state of particle Ui based on the measurement outcome, according
to Eq. (15), she can get Ui’s signature Si . After that, Alice sends particle C to
Charlie.
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In addition, Alice can get Ui’s secret key KCUi by intercept-resend attack.
Firstly, Alice intercepts KCUi(Si) in Step 2.2(e). Then she can get KCUi by adding
Si to KCUi(Si) as
KCUi = Si ⊕KCUi(Si). (22)
After that, Alice resends KCUi(Si) to Charlie.
From above, we can see Alice can not only get Si but also the secret key KCUi ,
then Alice can impersonate Ui successfully. Worse still, Alice can sign arbitrary
message at will. Alice can intercept KCUi(Si) and resend an arbitrary KCUi(S
′
i)
to Charlie, meanwhile, she modifies her measurement outcomes a in Step 2.2(a)
to satisfy the correlation of the GHZ state. Therefore, Alice’s cheating behaviour
cannot be discovered in the verification phase.
3.4 The collector Charlie can impersonate Ui successfully
According to the original scheme, collector Charlie can get Alice’s measurement
outcome a and his own outcome c, then he can deduce the state of particle Ui
based on the correlation of GHZ state. Therefore, he can get Ui’s signature Si.
Besides, Charlie has the secret key KCUi , consequently, Charlie can impersonate
Ui successfully. Even more, Charlie can also sign the message at random. Exactly,
Charlie can discard Ui’s signature Si, instead, he generates an arbitrary S
′
i and
modifies his measurement outcome c according to Table 1 to maintain the GHZ
correlation. Then S′i can pass the verification process definitely.
3.5 The receiver Bob can forge Ui’s signature
In the original scheme, the signatory Ui generates the blind signature Si by mea-
suring his particle in X-basis according to Eq. (15). Here we show the receiver Bob
can forge the signature by intercept-resend attack.
Firstly, the receiver Bob intercepts KCUi(Si) when it is sent from Ui to Charlie
and add an n-bit random string
l = i1i2 · · · in (23)
to KCUi(Si), then Charlie will get
S
′
i = Si ⊕ l. (24)
In order to make sure S′i can pass the verification process, Bob also intercepts
KAC(a), adds another n-bit random string
l
′ = j1j2 · · · jn (25)
to KAC(a) and resends it to Charlie. Then Charlie will get
a
′′ = a⊕ l′ (26)
instead of a.
Next, we illustrate that Bob can figure out l′ based on l and the correlation of
GHZ state as follows:
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1. If Si(j) = 0, then we can infer that the state of particle Ui is |+〉. From Table
1, we can see both of particle A and C are in state of |+〉 or in state of |−〉. In
other words, a(j) = c(j) = 0 or a(j) = c(j) = 1.
2. If Si(j) = 1, then particle Ui is the state of |−〉. According to Table 1, particle
A and C are in the state of |+〉 and |−〉 or |−〉 and |+〉 respectively. That is to
say a(j) = 0, c(j) = 1 or a(j) = 1, c(j) = 0.
From above, we can find that
Si(j)⊕ a(j)⊕ c(j) = 0 (27)
is satisfied in both of the two cases. Therefore, if S′i can pass the verification,
according to Eq. (27), S′i(j), a
′(j) and c(j) are bound to satisfy
S
′
i(j)⊕ a′′(j)⊕ c(j) = 0. (28)
Then we can get
l(j)⊕ l′(j) = 0. (29)
Therefore, we can easily get l = l′.
After that, Bob adds l to the message m which is received from Alice in Step
1(c) in the initial phase, according to the scheme, S′i will be accepted as Ui’s blind
signature of message m⊕ l. Therefore, Bob can forge the signature successfully.
3.6 The eavesdropper Eve can change the message m at will
Firstly, we show Eve can get message m by intercept-resend attack. Eve can in-
tercept GHZ particle Ui and C when they are sent from Alice to Ui and Charlie
separately. Then she measures them in Bell-basis, according to Eq. (17), Eve can
get each a(j) based on her own measurement outcome. According to Eq. (11), Eve
can get m with m∗ published by Alice.
Next, we show Eve can get Alice’s secret key KAC and KAB . Eve also can get
Alice’s secret key KAB by intercept-resend method. Eve intercepts KAB(m) when
it is sent from Alice to Bob, then she can get KAB by adding the message m to
KAB(m) as
KAB = KAB(m)⊕m. (30)
Meanwhile, Eve can compute a by using m∗ published by Alice in Step 2.2(a).
Similarly, Eve can get KAC using the same method.
From above, we can see Eve can not only get the message m but also Al-
ice’s secret keys, then Eve can impersonate Alice as the message sender. Besides,
Eve can intercept KAC(a) and KAB(m) and resend another pair of KAC(a
′) and
KAB(m
′′) to Charlie and Bob respectively, satisfying m∗ = a′ ⊕m′′. According to
the oringinal scheme, message m will be changed into m′′ and this modification
cannot be discovered in the verification process. As m′′ is arbitrary, then Eve can
change the message m at will.
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3.7 The eavesdropper Eve can modify the signature at will
Eve can intercept the GHZ particle Ui and C when they are sent from Alice to Ui
and Charlie separately. Instead, she performs a Pauli operator Z on each particle
and then sends them to Ui and Charlie separately. Next we show Eve can change
the signature through this method.
Assume Alice’s measurement outcome is a(j) = 0, according to Eq. (10), GHZ
particle A is in the state of |+〉. From Table 1, we can see particle Ui and C are
in two different cases: Case 1: both of them are in state of |+〉 and Case 2: both
of them are in state of |−〉. Next, we show that no matter what case it is, the
signature will be modified under Eve’s attack and this modification can pass the
verification process.
1. Case 1:
(a) Without Eve’s attack. In this occasion, we can easily see that Ui will gener-
ate Si(j) = 0 and Charlie will get c(j) = 0 by measuring their own particle
in X-basis respectively.
(b) Under Eve’s attack. The state of particle Ui is changed from |+〉 to Z|+〉 =
|−〉, so is particle C. We can get S′i(j) = 1 and c′i(j) = 1, but S′i(j), c′(j)
and a(j) still satisfy
S
′
i(j)⊕ c′(j)⊕ a(j) = 0. (31)
Then S′i(j) can pass the verification process.
2. Case 2 can be presented similarly.
From the above, we can see Eve can modify the signature at will.
4 An improved scheme
In this section, we design an improved scheme based on the original one. Before
presenting the new scheme, it is necessary to introduce the QOTP algorithm uti-
lized in this paper. Suppose a quantum message
|P 〉 =
l⊗
j=1
|Pj〉 (32)
is composed of l qubits
|Pj〉 = αj |0〉+ βj |1〉, (33)
where
|αj |2 + |βj |2 = 1. (34)
The QOTP encryption EK used in this scheme can be described as
EK(|P 〉) =
l⊗
j=1
σ
K4j
x σ
K4j−1
z Tσ
K4j−2
x σ
K4j−3
z |Pj〉 (35)
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where
W =
i√
3
(σx − σy + σz). (36)
This QOTP encryption algorithm is firstly introduced in Ref. [30]. The assistant
operator W can promise the encrypted message not to be forged. Specifically, for
arbitrary quantum message |P 〉, there are no non-identity unitary operator V and
U such that
E
†
KV EK |P 〉 ≡ U |P 〉. (37)
Assuming that there are a couple of non-identity unitary operators U and V sat-
isfying Eq. (37), then message |P 〉 can be modified into U |P 〉 deterministically by
the attacker in its transmission even though |P 〉 has been encrypted into EK |P 〉 ac-
cording to QOTP algorithm. Specifically, when |P 〉 has been encrypted into EK |P 〉
and transmitted in the quantum channel, the attacker Eve can intercept EK |P 〉
and perform the unitary operator V on it and resend V EK |P 〉 to the receiver, thus
the receiver performs the decryption operator E†
K
on V EK |P 〉 after he receives it.
According to Eq. (37), the receiver will finally get U |P 〉 in stead of |P 〉. For more
details we can refer to [24,30]. Introducing the improved QOTP algorithm into
our new protocol is mainly to avoid this problem.
In part 3.4 we can see the collector Charlie can alter the individual signature Si
at random in the original scheme. In order to make sure the originality of signature
generated by each signatory Ui in the improved scheme, we define a one-way hash
function [31]:
H(x) : {0, 1}∗ −→ {0, 1}n. (38)
After introducing the improved QOTP and defining the hash function, we pay
attention to the GHZ entanglement. Firstly, we rewrite GHZ state |φ〉 as
|φ〉 = |000〉123 + |111〉123√
2
=
|+〉1 ⊗ |β00〉23√
2
+
|−〉1 ⊗ |β10〉23√
2
. (39)
From Eq. (39), we can see if the particle 1 is in the state |+〉, then the particles 2
and 3 will be in the state |β00〉 definitely. Similarly, if the particle 1 is observed to
be |−〉, then the particles 2 and 3 will be |β10〉. Next, we do three operations on
the GHZ state |φ〉 as follows:
1. Perform a measurement on the particle 1 in X-basis and record the measure-
ment outcomes according to
a1 =
{
0 if the outcome is +,
1 if the outcome is −. (40)
2. Perform a Pauli operator I or X randomly on the particle 2 and record the
operation as
b1 =
{
0 if the operator is I,
1 if the operator is X.
(41)
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3. Do a two particle measurement on the particles 2 and 3 in Bell basis and record
the outcomes as
c1 =


00 if the state is observed as |β00〉,
01 if the state is observed as |β01〉,
10 if the state is observed as |β10〉,
11 if the state is observed as |β11〉.
(42)
Then we can find that
c1 = a1‖b1 (43)
is always satisfied. This will be utilized in our new scheme later.
Our new scheme involves t+ 3 participants, namely the message sender Alice,
t signatories U1, U2, · · · , Ut, the signature collector Charlie and the verifier Bob.
Firstly, Alice prepares t copies of n-bit classical message m and conceals each of
them with corresponding secret keys shared before, and then she sends the blind
messages to each signatory Ui. Subsequently, each Ui signs the blind message to
generate individual signature and sends it to Charlie. On receiving all the individ-
ual signatures, Charlie verifies each individual signature and aggregates them into
a multi-signature. Finally, Bob verifies the validity of the multi-signature.
(1) (2) (3)
Alice
Ut
...
U2
U1
Charlie Bob
1
3
5
7
4
2
6
Figure 1. The improved scheme: (1) individual blind signature phase;
(2) individual signature verification and multi-signature generation phase;
(3) multi-signature verification phase; 1 EKAUi (|ψ(Mi)〉); 2 EKCUi (|ψ(Si)〉)
and EKCUi (|ψ(M
′
i)〉); 3 EKAC (|ψ(a1)〉) and EKAC (|ψ(T )〉); 4 EKBC (|ψ(S)〉)
and EKBC (|ψ(m′)〉); 5 |φ〉1; 6 |φ〉2; 7 EAB(|ψ(m)〉).
The scheme is also composed of four phases: the initial phase, the individual
blind signature generation phase, the individual signatures verification and the
multi-signature generation phase, and the multi-signature verification phase. The
brief procedure of our scheme has been illustrated in Fig.1, and the description in
detail is presented as follows.
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 13
4.1 Initial phase
1. Alice transforms the original message into n-bit sequence as
m = m(1)‖m(2)‖ · · · ‖m(n). (44)
Message m is signed bit by bit.
2. Quantum key distribution. Alice shares 4n-bit secret keys KAB , KAC and
KAUi with Bob, Charlie and each signatory Ui, respectively. Charlie shares a
8n-bit secret key KCUi with each signatory Ui. Bob shares a 4n-bit secret key
KBC with Charlie. In order to ensure unconditional security, all the keys are
distributed by QKD protocols.
3. Alice transforms classical message m into n-qubit state
|ψ(m)〉 =
n⊗
j=1
|ψ(m(j))〉 (45)
according to computational basis {|0〉, |1〉} (i.e., |ψ(m(j))〉 = |0〉(|1〉), when
m(j) = 0(1)) and sends EKAB(|ψ(m)〉) to Bob, where EKAB is according to
QOTP algorithm introduced above. Note that, in subsequent phase, all the
classical information is turned into quantum states and encrypted by the same
QOTP algorithm before transmission.
4.2 The individual blind signature generation phase
1. Message blinding and transmission. Alice prepares t copies of n-bit classical
message m and blinds it into
Mi = m⊕K(n)AB ⊕K
(n)
AUi
(46)
where K
(n)
AB and K
(n)
AUi
are the first n-bit of the secret keys KAB and KAUi
respectively. Then she sends EKAUi (|ψ(Mi)〉) to each signatory Ui. After that
she also generates
T = m⊕
t⊕
i=1
Mi (47)
and sends EKAC (|ψ(T )〉) to Charlie.
2. Quantum channel setup. Charlie prepares n GHZ states |φ〉 denoted as
|φ〉 =
n⊗
j=1
|φ(j)〉, (48)
|φ(j)〉 = |000〉123 + |111〉123√
2
(49)
and sends the first and second particles of each GHZ state to Alice and each
signatory Ui respectively, keeping the third ones to his own. We use |φ〉1, |φ〉2
and |φ〉3 to denote the states of the first, second and third particles sequence:
|φ〉l =
n⊗
j=1
|φ(j)〉l, l = 1,2, 3. (50)
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Note that all the particles are distributed via secure quantum channel here.
Otherwise, we should add an entanglement checking process to make sure the
entanglement is maintained during the whole signature process.
3. Alice’s measurement. Alice generates an n-bit stochastic string a1 by perform-
ing a measurement on |φ〉1 in X-basis according to
a1(j) =
{
0 if the state is observed as |+〉,
1 if the state is observed as |−〉. (51)
Then she sends EKC(|ψ(a1)〉) to Charlie.
4. Individual signature generation. At this point, we use Ui as a representa-
tive to make a demonstration. First of all, Ui gets the blind message M
′
i by
first decrypting and then measuring in computational basis when he receives
EKAUi
(|ψ(Mi)〉) from Alice. Next, he generates its signature Si. In our new
scheme, each individual signature Si is a 2n-bit random string which is com-
posed of two parts: valid part and auxiliary part. The auxiliary part is used to
ensure the valid part’s originality during their transmission. We denote it as
Si = S
(1)
i ‖S
(2)
i , (52)
S
(2)
i = H(Ri‖S
(1)
i ‖M ′i), (53)
Ri = KAUi ⊕K(4n)CUi . (54)
On receiving each |φ(j)〉2, each Ui generates the valid part S(1)i by performing
a unitary operator I or X on each |φ(j)〉2 randomly:
Si(j) =
{
0 if Ui chooses to perform I,
1 if Ui chooses to perform X.
(55)
Then Ui sends EK(4n)CUi
(|φ′〉2) to Charlie.
4.3 The individual blind signatures verification and the multi-signature
generation phase
1. Charlie gets the string a′1 and T
′. First of all, Charlie gets a′1 and T
′ by perform-
ing a measurement on |ψ(a1)〉 and |ψ(T )〉 in computational basis respectively
after decrypting EAC(|ψ(a1)〉) and EAC(|ψ(T )〉) on receiving them from Alice.
2. Charlie generates a 2n-bit random string c1. Charlie combines each |φ′(j)〉2
with his own particle |φ(j)〉3 to form a two particle state after decrypting
E
K
(4n)
CUi
(|φ′〉2). Then he performs a two particle measurement in Bell basis to
generate a 2n-bit random string c1 according to
c1(2j − 1)c1(2j) =


00 if the state is observed as |β00〉,
01 if the state is observed as |β01〉,
10 if the state is observed as |β10〉,
11 if the state is observed as |β11〉.
(56)
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3. Charlie gets S′i and M
′′
i . After getting a
′
1 and c1, Charlie asks Ui to send
EKCUi
(|ψ(Si)〉) and EKCUi (|ψ(M
′
i)〉) to him. Then he measures |ψ(Si)〉 and
|ψ(M ′i)〉 in computational basis to abstract S′i and M ′′i after decrypting them.
4. Verification process of the individual signature Si. Owning to a
′
1, c1 and S
′
i,
Charlie verifies Si by verifying
c1(2j − 1)c1(2j) = a′1(j)S
′(1)
i (j), (j = 1, 2, · · · , n) (57)
is satisfied or not. If it is satisfied, S′i is accepted by Charlie as Ui’s signature of
blind message M ′′i , then he stores the pair (M
′′
i , S
′
i). Otherwise, S
′
i is rejected
by Charlie.
5. Multi-signature generation. Assume that S′1, S
′
2, · · · , S′t have been generated
and verified by Charlie, then Charlie produces the multi-signature S as
S =
t⊕
i=1
S
′(1)
i . (58)
At the same time, Charlie creates T ′′ by
T
′′ =
t⊕
i=1
M
′′
i . (59)
Then he can produce the message m′ through
m
′ = T ′′ ⊕ T ′. (60)
S is generated by Charlie as the multi-signature of m′. After that, Charlie
sends EBC(|ψ(m′)〉) and EBC(|ψ(S)〉) to Bob.
4.4 The multi-signature verification phase
1. Bob verifies the message m. Bob abstracts the message m′ and m′′ by perform-
ing a measurement on |ψ(m)〉 and |ψ(m′)〉 in basis of {|0〉, |1〉} respectively.
Then he compares them with each other. If m′ = m′′, Bob publishes the ver-
ification parameter V1 = 1 and continues to carry out the following steps.
Otherwise, he publishes V1 = 0 and terminates the scheme.
2. Bob verifies the multi-signature. After affirming the parameter V1 = 1, Alice
announces eachMi (i = 1, 2, · · · , t) and Charlie announces each S′i on the public
board. Meanwhile, each signatory Ui publishes the string Ri which is used to
generate their signature Si. On receiving all the information, Bob abstracts the
muti-signature S′ by performing a measurement on |ψ(S)〉 in computational
basis. Then Bob verifies whether the following equations are satisfied or not:
S
′ =
t⊕
i=1
S
′(1)
i , (61)
S
′(2)
i = H(Ri‖S
′(1)
i ‖Mi), (i = 1, 2, · · · , t). (62)
If all the equations are satisfied, Bob accepts S′ as the multi-signature of m′.
Otherwise, he rejects it and aborts the scheme.
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Finally, we list our improvements as follows:
1. All the classical information is transformed into quantum message before trans-
mission.Meanwhile, it is encrypted according to the improvedQOTP algorithm
which is introduced above.
2. Each individual blind signature is generated by performing a random operation
on a GHZ particle rather than measuring it directly.
3. The GHZ entanglement can be maintained during the whole signature process
by using secure quantum channel.
4. The originality of each individual signature can be ensured by utilizing a hash
function. Additionally, each blinded message M ′i is used to generate a compo-
nent of the individual signature S′i according to Eq. (53) which ensures that
any disturbance of the blinded message will destroy the signature scheme.
5. Public board is utilized in the verification process which ensures that everyone
can perform the verification when all the information is published.
6. The size of the multi-signature is constant rather than the original scheme
which is linear with the number of signatory.
Unfortunately, our new scheme’s security is based on the utilized hash function
rather than unconditional security.
5 Security analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of the new scheme. As we know, a secure
signature scheme should satisfy no forgery and no disavowal. Because our scheme
is a blind multiple signature which owns the merit of both blind signature and
multiple signature at the same time, we should also talk about the blindness and
the traceability. Blindness indicates the signatory cannot know the content of the
message that he has signed [32]. Traceability means once disagreement takes place,
the signatory can trace the message owner [32]. Additionally, we show that the
new scheme is secure against some collusion attack. Collusion attack is a kind of
attack strategy that some dishonest participants may collude to do some cheating
such as forging the signature without other participants’ participation or denying
what they have done in the signing phase [33,34,35].
5.1 No forgery
5.1.1 Alice cannot forge the signature
Each individual signature Si is generated by the signatory Ui’s performing a Pauli
operator I or X on his own GHZ particle sequence randomly. Therefore, Alice
cannot get any information on each individual signature rather than guessing. As
a result, Alice has to do some cheating in the signature’s transmission to forge
the signature successfully. Maybe there are two opportunities. One is that Al-
ice performs the forgery attack when the individual signature Si is transmitted
from Ui to Charlie. Unfortunately, all the classical information is transformed into
quantum states and encrypted according to the improved QOTP algorithm first
proposed in Ref. [30] in the new scheme. It is said that any quantum message
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encrypted by the QOTP algorithm cannot be forged. Then the forgery attack will
get failed definitely. The other opportunity is to utilize the GHZ correlation ex-
isting among Alice, Ui and Charlie. Through this method, Alice has to control
the whole quantum entanglement channel. Unfortunately, this cannot be realized
as the entanglement is distributed by secure quantum channel. Thus, this attack
strategy is bound to fail. Briefly, Alice cannot forge an arbitrary individual signa-
ture. Similarly, it is impossible for Alice to forge the multi-signature.
5.1.2 Charlie cannot forge the signature
Charlie, the signature collector who can get all the individual signatures and gen-
erate the multi-signature, is considered to be most likely to forge the signature
successfully. Here we show that Charlie cannot forge the signature either. Because
Charlie can get each individual signature and generate the multi-signature, he can
forge the signature by modifying each individual signature S′i into S
′′
i and keeping
the message m′ unaltered. As a result, the original multi-signature S′ is changed
into S′′. Charlie sends S′′ instead of S′ to Bob as the signature of m′. Charlie’s
forgery attack seems to be successful, but Charlie’s dishonest behavior is to be
caught in the verification process because Eq. (62) cannot be satisfied. Charlie can
modify each S
′(1)
i randomly, but he cannot know how to alter the corresponding
S
′(2)
i to fit his modification because Ri is only owned by Ui before it is published.
From the above, we can see it is impossible for Charlie to forge the signature.
5.1.3 Bob cannot forge the signature
Bob, the receiver and verifier, can forge the signature by substituting another
S′′ for the actual S′ after it has been verified. Then he claims that S′′ is the
signature of the message m′. Here we show Bob’s forgery attack will get failed
because everyone can witness his dishonest behavior by verifying Eq.(61) with all
the individual signatures being announced on the public board.
5.1.4 No forgery under participants’ collusion attack
The single participant’s forgery attacks have been discussed above, so we begin to
talk on participants’ collusion attacks:
1. The collusion among partial signatories.
To make a clear illustration, we assume that the first t − 1 signatories col-
laborate to forge the multi-signature S in this paper. In order to forge the
multi-signature S successfully, they have to bypass Ut and forge the individual
signature St. According to the scheme, St is a 2n-bit string composed of S
(1)
t
and S(2)t . S
(1)
t is generated by Ut’s performing a Pauli operator I or X on his
GHZ particle sequence randomly and then it is transmitted after being turned
into quantum message and then being encrypted by the improved QOTP algo-
rithm. The other t− 1 signatories cannot acquire it other than guessing. Even
though they can guess S(1)t correctly by a fluke, their forgery attack will get
failed as they cannot get Rt and Mt to generate the corresponding S
(2)
t to pass
the verification. Consequently, partial signatories cannot forge the signature.
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2. The collusion between partial signatories and Alice.
Partial signatoriesing with Alice can get Mt but still cannot get Ut’s Rt, so
they cannot forge the signature either.
3. The collusion between partial signatories and Charlie.
St is sent from Ut to Charlie, then they can get Ut’s individual signature. Here
we mainly show they cannot modify St. Charlie can modify S
(1)
t , meanwhile,
he modifies the corresponding string c to satisfy Eq. (57), then this modifi-
cation can pass the individual signature verification process. Unfortunately,
the modification cannot pass the multi-signature verification process. Though
Charlie has the blind message M ′ and the modified S
′′(1)
t , they are still lack of
Ut’s personal string Rt to alter S
′(2)
t to fit the modified S
′′(1)
t . Therefore, their
dishonest behavior will be discovered definitely.
4. The collusion between partial signatories and Bob.
Partial signatories choose to collaborate with Bob, they can get the message
m′ and derive Ut’s individual signature S
′
t, but they cannot modify S
′
t because
they do not have the essential material M ′t and Rt.
5. The collusion between Alice and Charlie.
Charlie in cooperation with Alice can ensure him to get each blind messageMi
before published, but this cannot make them to forge the signature successfully
because of the absence of Ri.
5.2 No disavowal
5.2.1 Each signatory cannot disavow his individual signature
Each signatory cannot disavow the truth that they have signed the message be-
cause each individual signature Si contains the string Ri including the secret keys
KAUi and K
(4n)
CUi
which are only owned by Ui. After verification, Ri has been pub-
lished on the public board. If signatory Ui disavows the signature for his own
benefit, his dishonest will be caught by Alice and Charlie by verifying Eq. (54).
5.2.2 Impossibility for Bob’s disavowal
Bob’s disavowal includes that Bob disavows his receiving or the integrity of the
multi-signature. Firstly, we show Bob cannot disavow his receiving the signature.
Bob should announce the verification parameter V1 after checking the message,
which indicates Bob has received EBC(|ψ(m′)〉) from Charlie. According to the
scheme, EBC(|ψ(S)〉) is sent with EBC(|ψ(m′)〉) simultaneously, Bob cannot dis-
avow his receiving the signature. Even if Bob sticks to that he has not got the
signature, Charlie can send him EBC(|ψ(S)〉) again or even publishes S. Then
everyone can witness he has received the signature. Next, we show Bob cannot
disavow the signature’s integrity. If m′ = m′′ but Bob claims that m′ 6= m′′ for his
own benefit, we can ask Alice, Charlie and Bob to announce the message m re-
spectively. Then Bob’s dishonest behavior will be discovered by Alice and Charlie
according to the voting rule. Note that here we assume that Alice and Charlie are
just loyal to their own and there is no collaborate attack.
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5.3 Secure against some external attacks
In the previous section, we have showed that the eavesdropper Eve can forge the
signature successfully by performing an intercept-resend attack on the original
scheme. Here we show our new scheme is secure against some external attacks.
First of all, we talk on the entanglement auxiliary particle attack. Entanglement
auxiliary particle attack is a general strategy for entanglement based protocols.
By this method, attackers entangle an ancillary particle into the entanglement
state by a CNOT operation and then disentangle it from the obtained state by
applying another CNOT operation to abstract what they want to know to forge
the signature [36]. Unfortunately, the GHZ entanglement particles are distributed
through secure quantum channel in the new scheme, then the entanglement auxil-
iary particle cannot be attached. Therefore, this attack can be avoided. Next, we
turn to the intercept-resend attack. All the classical information is transformed
into quantum message and encrypted by the improved QOTP algorithm, so the
intercept-resend attack will be failed. At last, we concern about the man-in-middle
attack. Man-in-middle attack means the malicious attacker counterfeits the signa-
tory and sends simultaneously particles and message to the receiver to temper the
message or forge the signature [32]. In the new scheme, secret keys distributed via
QKD protocol are shared among all the participants. Owing to the unconditional
security of QKD protocol, it is impossible for the malicious attacker to perform
man-in-middle attack to temper the message and forge the signature.
5.4 Blindness
In the new scheme, the message sender Alice sends the blinded message Mi =
m ⊕ K(n)AB ⊕ K
(n)
AUi
to each signatory Ui after being encrypted by the improved
QOTP algorithm. As Ui cannot get the secret key KAB shared between Alice and
Bob, it is impossible for Ui to abstract the message m.
5.5 Traceability
The new scheme is a kind of blind signature scheme, and therefore, each signatory
Ui cannot learn the content of the message. But Ui can track the message owner
when there is a disagreement taking place. As the blinded messageMi = m⊕K(n)AB⊕
K
(n)
AUi
, it includes the components of the secret keysKAB andKAUi simultaneously.
This indicates the message is from Alice definitely because KAB and KAUi are only
owned simultaneously by Alice.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the security of a broadcasting multiple blind sig-
nature scheme based on quantum GHZ entanglement. We have pointed out that
there exists some participant attacks and external attacks in the scheme and the
attack strategies have been presented in detail. After that, we have designed an
improved scheme and showed that the new scheme is secure against the attacks
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that are encountered by the original scheme. Besides, the new scheme is secure
against some collusion attack. Unfortunately, the security of our new scheme is
based on the utilized hash function rather than unconditional security. Recently,
based on quantum homomorphic signature [37], an unconditional secure broad-
casting blind multiple signature scheme has been designed. Maybe it has provided
us some probability to design an unconditional secure one in the future. The se-
cure quantum channel has been utilized in our new scheme, which will make it less
practical. Fortunately, a practical quantum digital signature has been presented
recently [38], in which the secure quantum channel has been removed. It is also
worth considering to design a more practical scheme in the future. Additionally, an
anonymous reviewer points out that the length of secret keys is much longer than
the message, which makes the protocol less efficient. It is also worth to considering
to improve it in the future.
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